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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Historically, water from Lake Okeechobee has flowed slowly over 
central and southern Florida creating a large wetland.1  In 1850, 
Congress transferred more than twenty million acres of this wetland2 to 
Florida for the express purpose of constructing “levees and drains to 
reclaim the swamp and overflowed lands therein . . . .”3  After several 
failed attempts at reclamation, Florida, with the help of the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, altered the natural flow of ground and surface water 
in the area, transforming some of the wetland into fertile farmland.4  The 
reclamation project, officially known as the Central and South Florida 
Project for Flood Control and Other Purposes (C&SF Project),5 involved 
four principal water control technologies: (1) levees; (2) water storage 
 1. “Before drainage and canalization, water moved through the Everglades as a 
slow but pervasive surface flow from Lake Okeechobee through a mosaic of sawgrass 
marshes, wet sloughs, and forested islands along a topographic gradient of about 1 m per 
56 km.”  Daniel L. Childers et al., Decadal Change in Vegetation and Soil Phosphorus 
Pattern Across the Everglades Landscape, 32 J. ENVTL. QUALITY 344, 346 (2003). 
 2. Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, The Destructive Role of Land Use 
Planning, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 95, 129 (2000).  Approximately 1.5 million acres of the 
20 million acres transferred has been converted into the Everglades National Park.  
Everglade National Park, Park Establishment, http://www.nps.gov/ever/eco/nordeen.htm 
(last visited Nov 8, 2005). 
 3. 43 U.S.C. § 982 (2000).  In full, the statute reads:   
To enable the several States (but not including the States of Kansas, Nebraska, 
and Nevada) to construct the necessary levees and drains, to reclaim the 
swamp and overflowed lands therein—the whole of the swamp and overflowed 
lands, made unfit thereby for cultivation, and remaining unsold on or after the 
28th day of September, A.D. 1850, are granted and belong to the several States 
respectively, in which said lands are situated: Provided, however, That said 
grant of swamp and overflowed lands, as to the States of California, 
Minnesota, and Oregon, is subject to the limitations, restrictions and conditions 
hereinafter named and specified in this chapter, as applicable to said three last-
named States respectively. 
Id. 
 4. Everglade Plan, Development of Central & South Florida (C&SF) Project,  
http://www.evergladesplan.org/about/restudy_csf_devel.cfm (last visited Nov. 08, 2005).  
In 2002, Florida ranked ninth in the value of farm products and second in production of 
fresh vegetables with sales of $6.85 billion and $1.6 billion, respectively. Florida 
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Overview of Florida Agriculture, 
http://www.florida-agriculture.com/agfacts.htm (last visited Jan 30, 2005). 
 5. The C&SF Project is a multipurpose project that was first authorized by the 
Flood Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 858, 62 Stat. 1171, 1175 (1948).
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areas; (3) canals; and (4) pump stations.6  The combined effect of these 
technologies was to stop the natural westward flow of the water and to 
artificially redirect the flow eastward, separating habitable regions from 
the surrounding wetland.7  Today, these regions are home to more than 
136,000 people and contain both urban and agricultural developments.8
In 2003, the C&SF Project was the subject of a Supreme Court case 
that could dramatically limit the reach of the Clean Water Act (CWA).9  
In South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of 
Indians, the Court heard arguments regarding whether a water transfer 
occurring within the C&SF Project could be regulated by the CWA’s 
primary pollution control program, the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES).10  The Court held that water transfers 
may be so regulated if they occur between two “meaningfully distinct” 
water bodies.11  In a somewhat surprising development, the government, 
in its amicus brief, advocated a radically new interpretation of the CWA, 
which would remove all water transfer activities from the reach of the 
NPDES permit program.12  The government’s interpretation is 
commonly known as the “unitary waters” approach because, under this 
 6. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 100 
(2004).  The C&SF Project works as follows: (1) canals collect ground water and 
rainwater from an area that includes urban, agricultural, and residential developments; 
(2) the pump stations transfer water from the canals to water storage areas; (3) the levees 
prevent the water from returning from water storage areas back to the urbanized areas. 
Id. 
 7. EVERGLADES: THE ECOSYSTEM AND ITS RESTORATION 60 (Steven M. Davis & 
John C. Ogden eds., 1994). 
 8. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 100. 
 9. Id. at 98-112. 
 10. Id. at 104. See discussion infra Section III for more information on the 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. 
 11. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 112.  The Court held that “a point source need not be 
the original source of the pollutant; it need only convey the pollutant to ‘navigable 
waters,’ which are, in turn, defined as ‘the waters of the United States.’” Id. at 105.  
However, the Court went on to state that “it is possible that the District Court will 
conclude that [they] are not meaningfully distinct water bodies.  If it does so, then the 
[transfer] will not need a NPDES permit.” Id. at 112. 
 12. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 19, S. Fla. 
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 
2003 WL 22137034. 
“[T]he waters of the United States” should be viewed as a whole for purposes 
of NPDES permitting requirements.  Once a pollutant is present in one part of 
“the waters of the United States,” its simple conveyance to a different part is 
not a “discharge of a pollutant” within the meaning of the Act. 
Id. 




approach, all waters of the United States are viewed as a singular water 
body.13
This Comment will, first, determine whether the government’s unitary 
waters approach is a viable interpretation of the CWA.  Second, it will 
explore what characteristics should be considered to determine whether 
two water bodies are “meaningfully distinct.”  Finally, this Comment 
will explore the possible consequences of applying the NPDES program 
to water transfers between two water bodies. 
In order to clarify this Comment, this section will summarize the 
important aspects of the Miccosukee case.  Section II will briefly introduce 
the CWA.  Section III will introduce the NPDES permitting program and 
will discuss the requirements of the NPDES program and how 
Miccosukee could alter those requirements.  Section IV will discuss the 
government’s unitary waters approach and consists of three parts: (1) an 
introduction to the government’s approach; (2) an analysis of the 
arguments in favor of the unitary waters approach; and (3) a discussion 
of whether other parts of the CWA are in conflict with the government’s 
interpretation.  Section V will discuss the characteristics that should be 
used to determine whether two water bodies are “meaningfully distinct.” 
Finally, section VI will explore the potential consequences of applying 
the NPDES program to water transfer activities. 
A. Summary of Miccosukee 
The Miccosukee Indian Tribe (Tribe) brought suit against the South 
Florida Water Management District (Water District) for the environmental 
harm caused by the C&SF Project.14  At the time of the case, the Water 
District was in charge of the C&SF Project.15  The litigation arose after 
the Tribe discovered that run-off from the surrounding developments 
had been channeled into the South New River Canal (Canal) and 
pumped into the Wetland Conservation Area Number Three (Wetland).16  
This was all done pursuant to the C&SF Project.17  The run-off that 
 13. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 105-06; see also Kristin Carden, Case Comment, 
South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 28 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 549, 554 (“[T]he Court discussed the ‘unitary waters’ argument advanced 
primarily by the federal government.”). 
 14. Brief for the Respondent Friends of the Everglades at 1-2, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. 
Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 
22733911.  The CS&F project channels agriculture run-off and pumps it back into the 
Everglades.  Id. at 5.  This run-off causes the growth of foreign vegetation, including cattails.  
Id. at 6.  Once these cattails take over, oxygen levels are no longer sufficient to support 
the native aquatic plant life or animals.  Id. 
 15. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 100. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 100-01. 
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flowed into the Canal had higher phosphorus levels than those naturally 
found in the Wetland.18  As a consequence, once pumped into the 
Wetland, the phosphorus-enriched water caused the growth of foreign 
vegetation, which began to threaten the existence of the naturally 
occurring flora.19
However, despite its negative environmental effects, the transfer of 
water could not be stopped without flooding a populous area and 
displacing thousands of residents.20 The Canal serves as a collection area 
for two main water sources.  First, it collects excess run-off from the 
surrounding agricultural and urban developments.21  Secondly, it collects 
water that naturally seeps into it from the Wetland. 22  Due to the porous 
nature of the surrounding soil, and the natural westward drainage flow, 
water is shared between the Wetland and the Canal.23
The Tribe alleged that the Water District violated the CWA by 
pumping the phosphorus-enriched water into the Wetland without 
obtaining an NPDES permit.24  An NPDES permit authorizes the dumping 
of polluted substances into waters of the United States.25  Generally, five 
elements must be present in order to trigger the need for an NPDES 
permit: “(1) a pollutant must be (2) added (3) to navigable waters 
(4) from (5) a point source.”26  Both parties agreed that the pump station 
that transfers water from the Canal to the Wetland is a point source, that 
the Wetland and the Canal are navigable waters, and that the water 
pumped into the Wetland contains pollutants.27  Therefore, the primary 
dispute centered on whether the pumping of water between the Canal 
and the Wetland constituted an addition of pollutants to navigable 
 18. Brief for Respondent Friends of the Everglades, supra note 14, at 6. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 100-01. 
 21. Id. at 100. 
 22. Id. at 110. 
 23. Id.  “Because Everglades soil is extremely porous, water flows easily between 
ground and surface waters, so much so that ‘[g]round and surface waters are essentially 
the same thing.’” Id. 
 24. See Brief for Respondent Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida at 12-14, S. 
Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 
2003 WL 22766719. 
 25. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (referring to 
when NPDES permits are required for dams). 
 26. Id. at 165. 
 27. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364, 
1367 (11th Cir. 2002). 




waters.28  If so, then an NPDES permit would be required to exchange 
water from the Canal to the Wetland.29
The Water District and the government, which became involved in the 
case because of the potential impact on the NPDES permitting 
program,30 contended that the pumping of water from the Canal to the 
Wetland did not fall under the NPDES program.31  The Water District 
argued that since water naturally seeps between the Wetland and the 
Canal, they share a hydrological connection and as such, are part of a 
single water body.32  In addition, the government argued that all waters 
of the United States should be viewed unitarily for purposes of NPDES 
permitting.33  Carried to its logical conclusion, such an assertion means 
that all waters within the United States are collectively one giant body of 
water and any conveyance within this singular body of water could 
never constitute an addition of pollutants.34  Therefore, according to the 
government’s argument, an NPDES permit would only be required when 
pollutants are first introduced into the waters of the United States.35  
Understood this way, the pumping of water from the Canal to the 
Wetland is merely a conveyance within the national water body and does 
not constitute an addition of pollutants as defined by the CWA.36
In response, the Tribe advocated that the Canal and the Wetland are 
two distinct water bodies because they do not share similar biological or 
ecosystem characteristics.37  In support of its argument, the Tribe 
pointed to the fact that the Wetland is home to unique vegetation and 
wildlife, while the Canal is not.38  In addition, the Tribe noted that the 
 28. Id. 
 29. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 102-03 
(2004). 
 30. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12 
at 1-2. 
 31. Id. at 14; Brief for Petitioner at 20-24, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. 
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22137015. 
 32. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31 at 46-49. 
 33. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 105-06. 
 34. Id. at 106. “Because the Act requires NPDES permits only when there is an 
addition of a pollutant ‘to navigable waters,’ the Government’s approach would lead to 
the conclusion that such permits are not required when water from one navigable water 
body is discharged, unaltered, into another navigable water body.”  Id. 
 35. For example, a company dumping pollution from their factory into a river 
would still require a NPDES permit.  However, if that pollution is later discharged into 
an adjacent lake via a pump station, then a NPDES permit is not required for that 
transfer. 
 36. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 109. 
 37. Id. at 110; see also Brief for Respondent Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of 
Florida, supra note 24, at 6-7. 
 38. “‘The Everglades is an extensive and unique wetlands system consisting of 
millions of acres of shallow sawgrass marshes, wet prairies, aquatic sloughs, and tree 
islands.’  The area provides a home for unique wildlife such as wading birds, and 
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Wetland and the Canal have drastically different water qualities and 
therefore should be considered two distinct water bodies.39
The federal district court granted the Tribe’s motion for summary 
judgment and issued an order requiring the Water District to obtain an 
NPDES permit for the pumping of water between the Canal and the 
Wetland.40  In addition, it enjoined the Water District from operating the 
pump station until an NPDES permit was obtained.41  The Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling but vacated the injunction due 
to the practical necessity of the pumping and the danger suspension 
would present to thousands of residents.42
In 2003, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.43  There was great 
interest in this case as shown by the twenty-three separate amicus briefs 
filed with the Court by a broad range of interested parties.44  To some, 
threatened and endangered species such as wood storks, snail kites, bald eagles, Florida 
panthers and American crocodiles.”  Brief for Respondent Miccosukee Tribe of Indians 
of Florida, supra note 24, at 6. 
 39. Id. at 7, 31 n.14. 
 40. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 99; Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water 
Mgmt. Dist., Nos. 98-6056-CIV, 98-6057-CIV, 1999 WL 33494862, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 
Sept. 30, 1999). 
 41. Id. at *6. 
 42. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364, 
1369-71 (11th Cir. 2002).  The appellate court held that “an addition from a point source 
occurs if a point source is the cause-in-fact of the release of pollutants into navigable 
waters.”  Id. at 1368.  The court went on to state that the Canal was the cause-in-fact of 
the addition of pollutants to the Wetland.  Id. at 1369.  However, the court did not affirm 
the injunction because “severe flooding” would occur to a residential area.  Id. at 1371. 
 43. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe Of Indians, 539 U.S. 957 
(2003). 
 44. The thirteen amicus briefs filed in support of the Water District consisted of 
the following: Brief for Amici Curiae Florida Fruit and Vegetable Ass’n et al. in Support 
of Petitioner, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 
(2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22118364; Brief of Idaho Governor Dirk Kempthorne as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe 
of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22118368; Brief Amicus Curiae 
of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of the Petitioner, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. 
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22118373; 
Brief of Amicus Curiae the City of Weston, Florida, in Support of Petitioner, S. Fla. 
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 
2003 WL 22137027; Brief for the Lake Worth Drainage District and the Florida Ass’n of 
Special Districts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner South Florida Water 
Management District, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 
U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22137027; Brief Amici Curiae of the National 
Water Resources Ass’n et al. in Support of Petitioner, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. 
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22137029; 
Brief of the National League of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, S. 




this case appeared to be about a simple issue of statutory interpretation.45  
For others, this case was an opportunity to clarify the reach of the 
NPDES program.46
After reviewing the record and hearing oral arguments, the Supreme 
Court decided to remand the case back to the district court because there 
was not enough information to determine whether the Canal and the 
Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-
626), 2003 WL 22137030; Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New 
Mexico in Support of Petitioner, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of 
Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22137032; Brief for United States 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12; Brief of Amicus Curiae National 
Ass’n of Home Builders in Support of Petitioner, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. 
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22196454; 
Brief for the Utility Water Act Group as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, S. 
Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 
2003 WL 22196594; Brief of Amici Curiae the City of New York et al. in Support of 
Petitioner, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) 
(No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22220093; Brief of Amici Curiae the Nationwide Public Projects 
Coalition et al. in Support of Petitioner, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe 
of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22137031.  The remaining ten 
amicus briefs filed in support of the Miccosukee Tribe consisted of the following: Brief 
of Amici Curiae National Wildlife Federation et al. in Support of Respondents, S. Fla. 
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 
2003 WL 22766717; Brief of the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondents, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 
(2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22766718; Amicus Curiae Brief of Tongue & 
Yellowstone River Irrigation District et al. in Support of Respondents, S. Fla. Water 
Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 
22793536; Brief of Amici Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of 
Environmental Protection in Support of Respondents, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. 
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22793537; 
Brief of Amici Curiae Florida Wildlife Federation et al. in Support of Respondents, S. 
Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 
2003 WL 22793538; Brief of Amici Curiae Former Administrator Carol M. Browner et al. of 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency in Support of Respondents, S. Fla. 
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 
2003 WL 22793539; Brief of Amici Curiae of the Coalition of Greater Minnesota Cities 
and the City of Saint Cloud, Minnesota in Support of Respondents, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. 
Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 
22811822; Brief Amici Curiae of the National Tribal Environmental Council and the 
National Congress of American Indians in Support of Respondents, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. 
Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 
23189937; Amicus Brief of the Association of State Wetland Managers and the Tropical 
Audubon Society in Support of Respondents, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee 
Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22733912; Brief of Amici 
Curiae Trout Unlimited Inc. et al. in Support of Respondents, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. 
v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22733910. 
 45. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, supra 
note 24, at 12-19. 
 46. See, e.g., Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
supra note 12, at 15. 
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Wetland were two “meaningfully distinct” water bodies.47  However, the 
Court gave no guidance on how to define “meaningfully distinct.”48  
Additionally, the Court declined to resolve whether the federal 
government’s “unitary waters” approach was a valid interpretation of the 
CWA because neither the government nor the Water District raised the 
issue before the Court of Appeals in its brief requesting certiorari.49  
Nevertheless, the Court did invite the parties to take up the issue on 
remand.50
II.  OVERVIEW OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 
commonly known as the Clean Water Act, marked a dramatic change to 
the overall strategy of federal water pollution legislation.51  Prior to 
1972, the main goal of federal water pollution laws was to assist the 
states in achieving their own water quality standards.52  In contrast, 
under the CWA, the federal government set a national standard of water 
quality that replaced all existing state standards.53  Incorporated into the 
national standard was the goal “to restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”54  In order to 
accomplish this goal, section 301(a) of the CWA prohibits the 
“discharge of any pollutant by any person” into navigable waters.55  This 
 47. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 112 
(2004). 
 48. Id. at 111-12. 
 49. Id. at 109. 
 50. Id. 
 51. William L Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United 
States—State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215 (2003). 
The Clean Water Act of 1972 was revolutionary in many ways.  It made the 
federal government the dominant authority in an area where the states had long 
held sway.  It instituted a new system of technology-based effluent limitations 
that would demand the same basic level of treatment for a particular industry, 
regardless of whether it was located in Georgia or New York, Louisiana or 
Wisconsin.  No longer could an industry so effectively block state pollution 
control efforts by threatening to relocate to a more lenient jurisdiction.  And no 
longer could discharge limitations be based solely upon the assimilative capacity 
of the receiving waterway and its ability to meet a designated use—which might 
well be only industrial or agricultural usage. 
Id. at 286. 
 52. Id. at 292. 
 53. Id. at 286. 
 54. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000). 
 55. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000). 




represented a change to the basic approach of setting water quality 
standards.  Before the passing of the CWA, water quality standards were 
set by determining how much pollution one water body could digest 
without exceeding the ambient water quality standard.56  In contrast, 
under the CWA, the national standard is exclusively concerned with 
eliminating all discharges of pollutants into U.S. waters.57
However, an exception to this zero pollution approach is contained in 
section 402 of the CWA, otherwise known as the NPDES permit 
program.58  Under the NPDES permit program, “the Administrator may, 
after opportunity for public hearing issue a permit for the discharge of 
any pollutant, or combination of pollutants,”59 upon condition that the 
discharger meets all applicable effluent standards under the law.60  The 
NPDES permit thus serves as a temporary patch until it is 
technologically and economically feasible for the polluter to reduce its 
discharge to zero.61
 56. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 7-8 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.A.N. 3668, 
3678. 
This section establishes a policy that the discharge of pollutants should be 
eliminated by 1985, that the natural chemical, physical, and biological integrity 
of the Nation’s waters be restored, and that an interim goal of a water quality 
allowing fish propagation and suitable for swimming should be reached by 
1981. The States are declared to have the primary responsibility and right to 
implement such a goal.  The policy declaration of the Federal Water Pollution 
Act has been revised substantially in order to represent the departure in Federal 
water pollution control policy from a water quality standards control 
mechanism to a discharge control mechanism.
Id.  Ambient water quality standards are defined as “provisions of State or Federal law 
which consist of a designated use or uses for the waters of the United States and water 
quality criteria for such waters based upon such uses.” 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(i) (2003). 
 57. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 7-8 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.A.N. 3668, 
3678; see ROGER W. FINDLEY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
386-89 (6th ed. 2003). 
 58. Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000); see also 33 U.S.C § 1311(a) 
(2000). 
 59. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2000). 
Except as provided in sections 1328 and 1344 of this title, the Administrator 
may, after opportunity for public hearing issue a permit for the discharge of 
any pollutant, or combination of pollutants, notwithstanding section 1311(a) of 
this title, upon condition that such discharge will meet either (A) all applicable 
requirements under sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, and 1343 of this 
title, or (B) prior to the taking of necessary implementing actions relating to all 
such requirements, such conditions as the Administrator determines are 
necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter. 
Id. 
 60. Id.; see also Karen M. McGaffey, Water Pollution Control Under the National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, in THE CLEAN WATER HANDBOOK 18 (Mark A. 
Ryan ed., 2d ed. 2003) (“The CWA requires all dischargers to comply with effluent 
limitations based on available pollution control technology.  These ‘technology-based 
limits’ are established after consideration of technological feasibility and cost.”). 
 61. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (2000).  This section states that the Administrator 
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III.  THE NPDES PERMIT PROGRAM 
A.  Background 
The origin of the NPDES permit program can be traced back to 
section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899 
(Refuse Act).62  This act gave authority to the Secretary of the Army, 
upon the advice of the Chief Engineer, to permit the deposit of any 
materials when “anchorage and navigation will not be injured thereby.”63  
The primary purpose of the Refuse Act was to prevent foreign objects 
from obstructing America’s waterways and, therefore, permits were only 
required for “industrial discharges of ‘refuse’ into navigable waters.”64
In 1972, the CWA transferred the Secretary of the Army’s authority to 
issue permits to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA).65  In addition, Congress expanded the scope of the permit to 
include the “discharge of any pollutant”66 in order for it to serve as the 
must require the elimination of all discharges if the “elimination is technologically and 
economically achievable for a category or class of point sources.”  Id. 
 62. 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 1342(a)(4), (2000). 
 63. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2000). 
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause, suffer, or 
procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, 
barge, or other floating craft of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, 
manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any 
kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers 
and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable water of the United 
States, or into any tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall 
float or be washed into such navigable water; and it shall not be lawful to 
deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to be deposited material of any kind in any 
place on the bank of any navigable water, or on the bank of any tributary of 
any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be washed into such 
navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or 
otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed. 
Id.  
 64. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 65. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2),(4) (2000). 
All permits for discharges into the navigable waters issued pursuant to section 
407 of this title shall be deemed to be permits issued under this subchapter, and 
permits issued under this subchapter shall be deemed to be permits issued 
under section 407 of this title, and shall continue in force and effect for their 
term unless revoked, modified, or suspended in accordance with the provisions 
of this chapter. 
33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(4) (2000). 
 66. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2000). 




major regulatory mechanism of the CWA.67  However, Congress limited 
the applicability of the permit by narrowing the phrase “discharge of any 
pollutant” to only include pollutants from a point source.68
Fundamentally, Congress limited the scope of the NPDES permit 
program because it wanted some of the control to remain with the 
states.69  The passing of the CWA marked a shift in the federal-state 
framework.  For the first time, the federal government was encroaching 
in state water use laws by setting a national water quality standard.70  
However, Congress still wanted some state involvement in water use 
legislation and permitting.71  As such, Congress gave states the authority 
to develop their own NPDES permit programs as long as they met the 
guidelines set forth by the EPA.72  Furthermore, pollutants that do not 
originate from a point source are predominately regulated by the states.73
In addition to issuing NPDES permits, Congress permitted the states 
along with the EPA to impose civil penalties on polluters.74  The civil 
penalties range from injunctive relief to monetary fines up to $25,000 
per day per violation.75  In addition, the CWA authorizes criminal 
 67. Keith Keplinger, The Economics of Total Maximum Daily Loads, 43 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 1057, 1058 (2003) (“The major regulatory mechanism of the CWA, the 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) focused on the technical 
feasibility of achieving effluent standards as the primary factor in establishing pollution 
controls in contrast to former clean water legislation, with its emphasis on state-
administered ambient standards.”). 
 68. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2000). 
 69. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000). 
It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary 
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, 
to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and 
enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult with the 
Administrator in the exercise of his authority under this chapter. 
Id.; see also Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 
U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (declining to extend the reach of the Clean Water Act to “an 
abandoned sand and gravel pit” even though it provided a habitat for migratory birds 
because it would intrude too far into state domain). 
 70. Andreen, supra note 51, at 286. 
 71. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000). 
 72. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000). 
 73. 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (2000); see also FINDLEY ET AL., supra note 57, at 470 
(“Either the states will undertake to regulate nonpoint sources on their own initiative or 
they won’t, and there appears to be nothing the EPA can do but to cheer on the ambitious 
and chide the apathetic.”). 
 74. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (2000) (“The Administrator is authorized to commence a 
civil action for appropriate relief.”). 
 75. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (2000) (“The amount of a class I civil penalty under 
paragraph (1) may not exceed $ 10,000 per violation, except that the maximum amount 
of any class I civil penalty under this subparagraph shall not exceed $25,000.”).  The 
largest fine ever was $12.6 million for almost 7,000 violations.  United States v. 
Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338, 354 (E.D. Va. 1997).  However, in 2002, the 
average penalty was $11,411 and the median penalty was $15,000.  U.S. Environmental 
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penalties of imprisonment and large monetary fines up to one million 
dollars.76
While the EPA and the states have the ability to enforce the effluent 
limitations of NPDES permits, the CWA authorizes citizens to bring 
civil actions against any person violating these limitations.77  Furthermore, 
citizens may bring a civil action against the EPA Administrator for 
failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty under the CWA.78
B.  Requirements of the NPDES Program 
An NPDES permit is required whenever a point source discharges 
pollutants into navigable waters.79  The key terms located within this 
section are: (1) discharge of pollutant; (2) point source; and (3) 
navigable waters.80  A review of these terms is helpful in evaluating 
when an NPDES permit is required by the CWA. 
1.  Discharge of Pollutant 
Under the CWA, a “discharge of a pollutant” is defined as “any 
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”81  
The meaning of “discharge of a pollutant” is constantly being reshaped 
by the courts and is not always straightforward.82  As a consequence, 
Protection Agency, Comparative Report and Civil and Criminal Penalties Assessed by U.S. 
EPA Region 5, http://www.epa.gov/region5/orc/annualreports/2002/pentrends92-02.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2005). 
 76. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2000).  For some examples of criminal convictions under 
the CWA, see Christine L. Wettach, Mens Rea and the “Heightened Criminal Liability” 
Imposed on Violators of the Clean Water Act, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 377, 384-93 (1996). 
 77. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (2000) (“[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on 
his own behalf—against any person . . . [or] any other governmental instrumentality or 
agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation of [the CWA]”).  In environmental 
legislation, Congress authorized citizen suits to “motivate governmental agencies 
charged with the responsibility to bring enforcement and abatement proceedings.”  
Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting Senate 
Committee on Public Works, S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 35-36 (1970)). 
 78. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (a)(2) (2000) (“[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action 
on his own behalf—against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the 
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this [Act].”). 
 79. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000). 
 80. McGaffey, supra note 60, at 9. 
 81. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2000). 
 82. See, e.g., S. Fl. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 
95 (2004); Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 




courts have come to different conclusions in cases involving similar 
activities.83  For example, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the stirring up of 
streambed sediment by re-circling water can be interpreted as a 
discharge of a pollutant.84  In contrast, the D.C. Circuit held that a dam 
that stirs up sediment, discharges supersaturated gases, and changes the 
water temperature is not adding pollutants.85
As a general rule, water allocation activities do not fall under the 
NPDES permitting program to the extent that the waters involved can be 
fairly treated as one single water body.86  The principle behind this rule 
is cleverly laid out with the following analogy: “If one takes a ladle of 
soup from a pot, lifts it above the pot, and pours it back into the pot, one 
has not ‘added’ soup or anything else to the pot.”87  In the same sense, if 
a dam removes pollutants from a lake and then re-deposits them into the 
same lake, a discharge of a pollutant has not occurred. 
Ultimately, the method adopted by the courts to ascertain whether two 
water bodies are “meaningfully distinct” will determine whether water 
transfer activities will fall under the reach of the NPDES permitting 
program.  For example, if all waters of the United States are viewed as one 
giant body of water, as the government’s unitary waters approach implies, 
then discharges from water transfer stations would simply be re-circulating 
pollutants already present in the water and would thus be exempted from 
NPDES permits.  On the other hand, if the courts reject the unitary waters 
approach, then water transfers between two “meaningfully distinct” water 
bodies could require an NPDES permit. 
2.  Point Source 
Under the CWA, a “point source” is defined as “any discernable, 
confined and discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may 
273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumer Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 
(6th Cir. 1988); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 83. Compare Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 156, with Rybacheck v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 84. Rybacheck, 904 F.2d at 1285 (holding that placer mining that caused rock, 
sand, and minerals from the streambed to be re-suspended in the water column 
constituted a discharge of a pollutant as defined by the CWA). 
 85. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 175 (holding that water flowing over a dam causing 
supersaturation of entrained gas in addition to stirring up the downstream sediment did 
not constitute a discharge of a pollutant as defined by the CWA). 
 86. See Consumer Power, 693 F.2d at 584; Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 175; see also 
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 12, at 16-17. 
 87. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 110 (quoting Catskill, 273 F.3d at 492).  In Catskill, 
this analogy was used to illustrate for the reader the differences between its facts and 
those in Gorsuch and Consumer Power.  Catskill, 273 F.3d at 492. 
BLANK.DOC 12/22/2005  11:18 AM 
[VOL. 42:  1259, 2005]  The Unitary Waters Approach 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1273 
 
be discharged.”88  According to EPA regulations, “this definition includes 
surface runoff collected and channeled by human effort, and discharges 
through pipes, sewers, or other conveyances leading to privately owned 
treatment works.”89  However, the CWA excludes several potential sources 
of pollution from being a point source.  For example, agriculture 
stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture are not 
point sources.90
If the source is determined to not be a point source, then by default it 
becomes a nonpoint source.91  In turn, if the pollution comes from a 
nonpoint source, then it is characterized as nonpoint source pollution.  
Under the CWA, an NPDES permit is not required for nonpoint source 
pollution; instead, such pollution is predominately regulated by the 
states.92
Since the CWA treats point and nonpoint sources so differently, “the 
determination of what constitutes a point source is very consequential.”93  
Generally, the courts have held that the point versus nonpoint source 
character of a pollutant is determined at the time it first enters the waters 
of the United States.94  This interpretation coincides with the EPA’s 
policy that pollution should be addressed at its source, not at subsequent 
transfers between two bodies of water.95
 88. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000). 
 89. McGaffey, supra note 60, at 11 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1999)). 
 90. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000) (point source “does not include agricultural 
stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture”). 
 91. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 165-66. 
[T]he Act divides the causes and control of water pollution into two categories, 
point sources of pollutants (regulated through the § 402 permit program) and 
nonpoint sources of pollution (regulated by the states through ‘areawide waste 
treatment management plans’ under § 208, 33 U.S.C. § 1288).  The latter 
category is defined by exclusion and includes all water quality problems not 
subject to § 402. 
Id. 
 92. Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 
1998) (“[T]he Act provides no direct mechanism to control nonpoint source pollution but 
rather uses the ‘threat and promise’ of federal grants to the states to accomplish this 
task.”); see also Michael C. Blumm & William Warnock, Roads Not Taken: EPA vs. 
Clean Water, 33 ENVTL. L. 79, 82 (2003) (stating that nonpoint source pollution 
“remains largely free of federal regulation”). 
 93. FINDLEY ET AL., supra note 57, at 417. 
 94. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 175 (stating that the “point or nonpoint character of 
pollution is established when the pollution first enters navigable water”). 
 95. Id. at 175-76. 




The approach adopted by the courts to determine whether two bodies 
of water are “meaningfully distinct” has the potential to undermine the 
EPA’s policy.  Consider what would happen if the courts adopt the 
hydrological connection test, proposed by the Water District,96 to 
determine whether two bodies of water are meaningfully distinct.  Under 
this approach, transfers between water bodies that do not naturally flow 
into one another would fall under the reach of the NPDES permit 
program.  If the water is polluted, then once the pollution is transferred it 
would become point source pollution because water transfer stations are 
considered point sources.97  This is true regardless of how the pollution 
first entered the waters of the United States.  For example, if the 
pollution first enters U.S. waters in compliance with the CWA (from a 
nonpoint source or an NPDES authorized polluter), and then is 
subsequently transferred by a regulated water transfer station, the 
pollution would change from “authorized” pollution to point source 
pollution, requiring an NPDES permit.  This would unjustly hold water 
transfer facilities accountable for polluted water that they simply move 
from point A to point B.  Furthermore, characterizing bodies of water in 
this fashion would require multiple parties to obtain NPDES permits for 
the same pollution. 
3.  Navigable Waters 
Under the CWA, “navigable waters” are defined as “the waters of the 
United States, including the territorial seas.”98 In adopting this definition, 
Congress wanted to give “navigable waters” the broadest meaning 
permissible under the Commerce Clause.99
Furthermore, two Supreme Court cases expanded the definition of 
navigable waters to include non-navigable water bodies that share a 
significant connection with navigable water bodies.100  In both of these 
decisions, the Court discussed factors that should be analyzed when 
 96. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 110 
(2004). 
 97. Id. at 105. 
 98. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000). 
 99. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985) 
(“In adopting this definition of ‘navigable waters,’ Congress evidently intended . . . to 
exercise its powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate at least some waters that 
would not be deemed ‘navigable’ under the classical understanding of that term.”). 
 100. See id. (holding that the CWA extends to wetlands that are adjacent to other 
water bodies over which the government has jurisdiction); Solid Waste Agency of N. 
Cook County v. U.S. Army of Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (holding that 
“an abandoned sand and gravel pit” falls outside the reach of the CWA because it does 
not have a significant nexus with a water body over which the government has 
jurisdiction). 
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deciding whether two water bodies are sufficiently interconnected to be 
considered one larger water body.101  Even though these cases deal with 
non-navigable water bodies, the same factors can be used by the lower 
courts to interpret what the Supreme Court meant by “meaningfully 
distinct” water bodies in its Miccosukee decision. 
The first of these two Supreme Court cases is United States v. Riverside 
Bayview Homes, Inc.102  In this case, the Court extended the CWA’s 
definition of navigable waters to include non-navigable wetlands that are 
adjacent to navigable water bodies.103  The Court held that non-navigable 
wetlands should be considered “waters of the United States” because they 
affect the water quality of adjacent lakes, rivers and streams in several 
ways.104  For instance, even though some wetlands do not receive water 
from adjacent sources, they can still drain into the adjacent waters.105  In 
these circumstances, the wetlands serve as a filter or a purifier for the 
water draining into the adjacent waters.106  In addition, the wetlands can 
prevent flooding and erosion of the adjacent water body by slowing down 
the flow of surface run-off.107  Finally, adjacent wetlands function as an 
integral part of the overall aquatic environment by providing general 
habitat, spawning, rearing and resting sites for aquatic species.108  The 
decision to include non-navigable wetlands within the definition of 
“waters of the United States” reflects the Court’s recognition of the 
ecological and biological connection between adjacent waters. 
The second of the Supreme Court cases that deal with the expansion 
of the CWA’s definition of navigable waters to include non-navigable 
water bodies is Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers.109  In this case, the Court narrowed its earlier 
decision in Riverside by mandating that there be a minimum level of 
connection between the non-navigable water body and the adjacent 
navigable water body.110  The Court concluded that only non-navigable 
 101. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 134-35; Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County, 531 
U.S. at 170-74. 
 102. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 139. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 134. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 134-35. 
 109. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army of Corps of Eng’rs, 531 
U.S. 159 (2001). 
 110. Id. at 167. 




waters that actually abut, are inseparably bound up with, or have a 
significant nexus with a navigable waterway would be considered 
“waters of the United States.”111  Applying this new standard, the Court 
concluded that a significant nexus is not present if the only connection 
between the two water bodies is their concurrent use by a few migratory 
birds.112
IV.  THE UNITARY WATERS APPROACH 
A.  An Introduction to the Unitary Waters Approach 
In Miccosukee, the government argued for a unitary waters or national 
approach in defining the nation’s water system.113  Under this approach, 
“all the water bodies that fall within the [CWA]’s definition of 
‘navigable waters’ . . . should be viewed unitarily for purposes of NPDES 
permitting requirements.”114  In other words, all waters of the United 
States should be viewed as one giant water body.  This approach has the 
ability to significantly diminish the scope of the NPDES permitting 
program by permanently exempting all water transfers from requiring a 
permit. 
B.  An Analysis of the Unitary Waters Approach 
The government presents three arguments to support its unitary waters 
approach.  First, the unitary waters approach preserves the EPA’s 
longstanding viewpoint that “the process of merely transporting, 
impounding, and releasing navigable waters that may already contain 
pollutants does not constitute an ‘addition’ of pollutants to the ‘waters of 
the United States.’”115  Second, it preserves the states’ traditional power 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 174.  This holding invalidated the longstanding interpretation commonly 
known as the “Migratory Bird Rule.” Robert R.M. Verchick, Toward Normative Rules 
for Agency Interpretation: Defining Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. 
REV. 845, 871-72 (2004).  The “Migratory Bird Rule” includes, within the reach of the 
CWA, any waters “[w]hich are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by 
Migratory Bird Treaties” or “[w]hich are or would be used as habitat by other migratory 
birds which cross state lines.”  Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of 
Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986). 
 113. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 105-06 
(2004). 
 114. Id.  
 115. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12, 
at 16. 
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to use their water resources as they see fit.116  Lastly, the text and 
structure of the CWA signifies Congress’s intent to view the nation’s 
water system as a whole for the purposes of NPDES permitting 
requirements.117
1.  Preserving the EPA’s Longstanding View 
The first policy argument used to support the government’s unitary 
waters approach is that it preserves the EPA’s longstanding position that 
water transfer activities are exempted from the NPDES permit program.118  
However, the EPA has never formally adopted this viewpoint.119  The 
government gleaned this longstanding position from a pair of cases, 
commonly known as the “dam” cases.120  In these cases, the EPA 
promulgated that, with respect to pollution, an “addition from a point 
source occurs only if the point source itself physically introduces a 
pollutant into water from the outside world.”121
The “dam” cases consist of two circuit court decisions: National 
Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch122 and National Wildlife Federation v. 
Consumer Power Company.123  In Gorsuch, a dam had caused a variety 
of interrelated water quality problems to a river downstream from it.124  
These problems consisted of low dissolved oxygen levels, dissolved 
minerals and nutrients, water temperature changes, sediment release, and 
supersaturation.125  The end result of these water quality changes was the 
 116. Id. at 25 & n.11 (“‘It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State 
to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or 
otherwise impaired by [the [CWA]].’” (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000))). 
 117. Id. at 16-21. 
 118. Id. at 15-20. 
 119. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 
F.3d 481, 490 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Instead, the EPA’s position is based on a series of 
informal policy statements made and consistent litigation positions taken by the EPA 
over the years, primarily in the 1970s and 1980s.”). 
 120. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12, 
at 16-17. 
 121. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Nat’l 
Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumer Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1988). 
 122. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 156. 
 123. Consumer Power, 862 F.2d at 580. 
 124. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 161. 
 125. Id.  Supersaturation occurs when water plunges at high velocity into a water 
body.  Id. at 164.  Depending on the velocity and turbulence, the receiving water body 
could become aerated in excess of normal concentration.  Id. This excess aeration is 
harmless to humans but can be fatal to fish.  Id. 




destruction of nearly a half-million fish.126  In Consumer Power, a dam 
located on Lake Michigan generated power by forcing water through its 
turbines.127  During the normal operation of the dam, fish would be 
sucked into the generator and would be destroyed as a consequence.128  
Afterwards, the water, along with the dead fish, would be pumped back 
into Lake Michigan, thereby diminishing water quality.129
The EPA has consistently maintained that dam-induced water changes 
are not covered under the CWA and as such do not require an NPDES 
permit.130  In both “dam” cases, the courts gave great deference to the 
EPA’s interpretation and adopted its viewpoint in their rulings.131  In 
arguing for a unitary waters approach, the government has interpreted 
the “dam” holdings as proof of the EPA’s longstanding position that 
water transfer activities are exempted from the NPDES permit 
program.132
Recently, three U.S. courts of appeals (including the appellate court in 
Miccosukee) have undermined this position by holding that an NPDES 
permit can be required for water transfer activities between two separate 
bodies of water.133  These three courts recognized that the “dam” courts 
adopted the EPA’s position that an NPDES permit is only required for 
point sources that introduce pollutants into waters of the United States 
from the outside world.134  However, neither the EPA nor the “dam” 
courts had established whether the “outside world” included other bodies 
 126. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 1291, 1302 (D.D.C. 1982), 
rev’d, Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 127. Consumer Power, 862 F.2d at 581-82. 
 128. Id. at 582. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 587; see also Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 168 (“[The] EPA has never changed 
its basic position that dams generally do not require NPDES permits.”). 
 131. See Consumer Power, 862 F.2d at 590; see also Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 183 
(“[The] EPA’s interpretation is reasonable, not inconsistent with congressional intent, 
and entitled to great deference; therefore, it must be upheld.”). 
 132. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12, 
at 16-17.  In its Brief the government stated that the “EPA and the lower courts have 
long recognized that the process of merely transporting, impounding, and releasing 
navigable waters that may already contain pollutants does not constitute an ‘addition’ of 
pollutants to ‘the waters of the United States’ in the sense that the Clean Water Act uses 
those terms.”  Id. at 16. 
 133. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364, 
1368-69 (11th Cir. 2002); Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of 
New York, 273 F.3d 481, 491 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he transfer of water containing 
pollutants from one body of water to another, distinct body of water is plainly an 
addition and thus a ‘discharge’ that demands an NPDES permit.”); Dubois v. Loon 
Mountain Recreation Corp., 102 F.3d 1273, 1299 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that the transfer 
of water from one water body to another constitutes an “addition”). 
 134. Miccosukee, 280 F.3d at 1367; Catskill, 273 F.3d at 491; Dubois, 102 F.3d at 
1299. 
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of water.135  All three appeals courts determined that in the “dam” cases, 
the EPA was not arguing for a complete exemption of all water transfer 
activities, but only an exemption for those transfers that occur within the 
same water body.136
However, the “dam” cases need to be put in the proper context.137  
First, in both “dam” cases the body of water that was receiving the 
“polluted water” and the body of water which was the source of the 
“polluted water” were one and the same.138  Second, the issue in the 
“dam” cases was whether certain dam-induced water quality changes 
constituted discharges of pollutants, not whether the pollutants traveled 
from one water body to another.139
The three appeals courts distinguished the “dam” cases and expressly 
stated that the EPA had never adopted the position that all water transfer 
activities were exempted from the NPDES permitting program.140  All 
three courts dismissed the exception argument stating that the “outside 
world” includes other water bodies.141
Of the three appellate-level cases, the most pertinent is Catskill Mountain 
Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. City of New York.142  In Catskill, the conflict 
involved the Shandaken Tunnel, which transferred water from the more 
polluted Schoharie Reservoir to Esopus Creek, a world class trout stream.143  
In this case, the court refused to adopt the EPA’s position on dam 
exemptions because unlike the “dam” cases, the water was diverted from 
one water body through a tunnel to a completely different water body.144
 135. See Miccosukee, 280 F.3d at 1368; Catskill, 273 F.3d at 491; see also Brief for 
the Respondent Friends of the Everglades, supra note 14, at 27-28. 
 136. Miccosukee, 280 F.3d at 1367-68; Catskill, 273 F.3d at 491; Dubois, 102 F.3d 
at 1299. 
 137. Catskill, 273 F.3d at 492 (“The Gorsuch and Consumer Power decisions 
comport with the plain meaning of ‘addition,’ assuming that the water from which the 
discharges came is the same as that to which they go.”). 
 138. Id. at 491-92. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See, e.g., id. at 490. 
If the EPA’s position had been adopted in a rulemaking or other formal 
proceeding, deference of the sort applied by the Gorsuch and Consumers 
Power courts might be appropriate.  Instead, the EPA’s position is based on a 
series of informal policy statements made and consistent litigation positions 
taken by the EPA over the years, primarily in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Id. 
 141. See supra text accompanying note 133. 
 142. Catskill, 273 F.3d at 481. 
 143. Id. at 484-85. 
 144. Id. at 492. 




The Catskill ruling is bolstered by the fact that the EPA has never 
issued a formal position contradicting the result.145  Therefore, in light of 
the decision in Catskill and the EPA’s response to it, it appears that the 
government’s first argument—preserving the EPA’s longstanding 
unitary waters view—is not entirely accurate.  The government’s 
argument will have persuasive value only if the EPA takes the formal 
position that all water transfer activities merely connecting or conveying 
navigable waters are exempted from NPDES permitting. 
2.  Maintaining States’ Rights 
The second policy argument in support of the government’s unitary 
waters approach is that such approach preserves the states’ traditional 
power to regulate and use their water resources.146  This power is 
codified in section 1251 of the CWA which declares, “[i]t is the policy 
of Congress that the authority of each State to allocate quantities of 
water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or 
otherwise impaired by this [Act].”147  It is the government’s opinion that 
requiring NPDES permits for water transfer activities within a state’s 
borders would violate section 1251.148
First, requiring NPDES permits for water transfer activities could 
interfere with the maximum utilization of the states’ water resources.149  
In the western United States, water is scarce.150  Consequently, it is 
important for these states to be able to transfer water freely within their 
 145. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 107 
(2004) (“[T]he Government does not identify any administrative documents in which 
EPA has espoused that position.”).  Furthermore, there is some evidence that the EPA 
took the opposite position in the past.  Brief of Amici Curiae Former Administrator 
Carol M. Browner et al. of the United States Environmental Protection Agency in 
Support of Respondents, supra note 44, at 17-18.  In a formal decision, the EPA General 
Counsel stated “[i]t is therefore my opinion that, even should the finder of fact determine 
that . . . [the] ditch is a navigable water, it would still be permittable as a point source 
where it discharges into another navigable water body, provided that the other point 
source criteria are also present.”  Id. (quoting EPA General Counsel Opinions, No. 21 
(June 27, 1975)). 
 146. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 
12, at 25-28. 
 147. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000). 
 148. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 
12, at 25. 
 149. Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico in Support of 
Petitioner, supra note 44, at 11-22; see also Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Water 
Resources Ass’n et al. in Support of Petitioner, supra note 44, at 14-19. 
 150. Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico in Support of 
Petitioner, supra note 44, at 2 (“West of the 100th Meridian, the nation is generally arid; that 
is, it receives less than thirty inches of annual precipitation necessary to sustain non-irrigated 
agriculture.”). 
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borders in order to meet the needs of their populations.151  This is 
especially true in cases of emergency.  For instance, over the past few 
years, some western states have experienced devastating droughts and 
accompanying wild fires.152  In order to fight these droughts and fires, it 
is necessary to quickly transfer vast quantities of water.153  If NPDES 
permits were required for these transfers, then it is possible that these 
transfers would be delayed.154
Second, NPDES permits would impair existing state water 
activities.155  Many states, especially in the West, move vast quantities of 
water among and within various bodies of water within their borders in 
order to meet a wide range of needs.156  Some of these transfers involve 
moving water from more polluted water bodies to less polluted ones.157  
 151. For example, in Colorado sixty percent of its citizens depend on water that is 
transferred from other areas.  Id. at 2-3. 
 152. “In 2002, Colorado experienced its most severe single-year drought on 
record.”  Melinda Kassen, Statutory Expansion of State Agencies’ Authority to 
Administer and Develop Water Resources in Response to Colorado’s Drought, 7 U. 
DENV. WATER L. REV. 47, 48 (2003).  In 2003, California experienced severe wild fires 
in which 959,955 acres were burned.  Joel Rubin et al., Weather Cools Wildfires’ Fury, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct 31, 2003, at Al. 
 153. Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico in Support of 
Petitioner, supra note 44, at 18-20. 
 154. An application for a NPDES permit is required to be submitted at least 180 
days before the date of the initial discharge.  40 C.F.R. § 122.21(c) (2003).  Furthermore, 
a permit is effective 30 days after the agency decisions. 40 C.F.R. § 124.15(b).  
Therefore, under the normal terms of the NPDES permit program, a state would be 
required to wait at least 210 days before a NPDES permit could be issued and made 
effective. 
 155. Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico in Support of 
Petitioner, supra note 44, at 17-30; Brief of Amici Curiae the Nationwide Public Projects 
Coalition et al. in Support of Petitioner, supra note 44, at 5-14. 
 156. The California State Water Project is the nation’s largest water conveyance 
system.  California Department of Water Resources, The SWP Today, http://www. 
publicaffairs.water.ca.gov/swp/swptoday.cfm (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).  It consists of 
33 storage facilities, 21 lakes and reservoirs, and 662 miles of canals and pipelines.  Id.  
This unique system supplies the water for more than twenty million Californians.  
California Department of Water Resources, Central Valley Project, 
http://www.publicaffairs.water.ca.gov/swp/cvp.cfm (last visited Oct. 27, 2005).  An 
example of a smaller water conveyance system is the Colorado-Big Thompson Project.  
Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 44, at 16 n.14.  In this project, enough water is transferred to irrigate over 
600,000 acres.  Id. at 2. 
 157. Run-off from snow melt and thunderstorms can contain naturally occurring 
pollutants that would trigger the need for a NPDES permit if the water containing the 
run-off is later transferred.  Brief Amici Curiae of the National Water Resources Ass’n et 
al. in Support of Petitioner, supra note 44, at 16.  Furthermore, the majority of water 
conveyance systems in the West use open ditches and canals which are directly impacted 




If the NPDES permitting program reaches these water transfer activities, 
then these transfers would require a permit.  States could be forced to 
spend millions of dollars constructing treatment facilities in order to 
comply with the NPDES permitting process.158  If the states could not 
afford to make the changes necessary to comply with the NPDES permit 
system, then some water transfer activities might be stopped. 
Third, permitting water transfer activities could interfere with interstate 
water allocations.159  A significant number of water transfer activities 
occur within interstate stream systems.160  The water from these systems 
is allocated by multi-state compacts or Supreme Court decrees.161  
Subjecting these water transfer activities to the NPDES permitting 
program would have “significant practical consequences” for interstate 
allocations.162  For instance, a state that is on the giving end of water 
allocations could, if its water transfer station were required to obtain a 
permit, be forced to build expensive treatment facilities or reduce the 
amount of water that it transfers in order to comply with the permit.163  
As a consequence, the states on the receiving end of these water 
allocations would experience higher water costs or a decrease in the 
amount of water available for beneficial use.164
However, while requiring an NPDES permit would demand more 
from individual states in terms of compliance, it is not clear whether 
subjecting water transfer activities to the NPDES permitting program 
would unduly infringe on the states’ rights.  First, a vast majority of the 
water transfers would not fall under the reach of the NPDES program 
because they either involve transfers from more pristine waters to those 
by run-off.  Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico in Support of 
Petitioner, supra note 44, at 16 n.13. 
 158. Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico in Support of 
Petitioner, supra note 44, at 15-16. 
To avoid the potential to cause an excursion above the water quality standards 
of the receiving water body during spring runoff, a transbasin diverter might 
have to expend millions of dollars to construct a treatment facility or 
implement so-called best management practices in an attempt to reduce the 
presence of even natural pollutants. 
Id. 
 159. See supra note 156. 
 160. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 44, at 1-4. 
 161. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 617l (2000) (authorizing the Colorado River Compact 
signed by Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming); 
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 592 (1963) (allocating the lower Colorado River 
among Arizona, California, and Nevada). 
 162. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 108 
(2004); see also supra text accompanying notes 155-157. 
 163. See supra text accompanying note 158. 
 164. Id. 
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that are less pristine or consist simply of diverting water away from a 
body of water.165  Second, even if an NPDES permit is required, there 
are several ways to expedite the process.  The EPA and the states166 have 
the authority to issue “general permits” which can cover an entire 
category of activities.167  These general permits could substantially 
streamline the permitting process and provide considerable flexibility in 
scheduled compliance.168  In addition, if the states had to issue individual 
NPDES permits, their familiarity with the affected bodies of water 
would allow them to act quickly on permit applications.169
3.  Statutory Interpretation of the Clean Water Act. 
The government argues that the language of the CWA supports its 
unitary waters approach.170  As mentioned before, the CWA defines the 
term “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of any pollutant to 
 165. Brief of Amici Curiae Former Administrator Carol M. Browner et al. of the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency in Support of Respondents, supra note 
44, at 24-25. 
 166. Forty-two out of the fifty states have the authority from the EPA to issue 
general permits. 65 Fed. Reg. 50,528, 50,529 (Aug. 18, 2000); see also Randy Hill, 
NPDES Permit Application and Issuance Procedures, in THE CLEAN WATER HANDBOOK 
43 (Mark A. Ryan ed., 2d ed. 2003). 
 167. 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(b)(2)(v) (2003). 
Discharges . . . may, at the discretion of the Director, be authorized to 
discharge under a general permit without submitting a notice of intent where 
the Director finds that a notice of intent requirement would be inappropriate.  
In making such a finding, the Director shall consider: the type of discharge; the 
expected nature of the discharge; the potential for toxic and conventional 
pollutants in the discharges; the expected volume of the discharges; other 
means of identifying discharges covered by the permit; and the estimated 
number of discharges to be covered by the permit.  The Director shall provide 
in the public notice of the general permit the reasons for not requiring a notice 
of intent. 
Id. 
 168. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 108 
n.* (2004). 
General permits greatly reduce that administrative burden by authorizing 
discharges from a category of point sources within a specified geographic area.  
Once EPA or a state agency issues such a permit, covered entities, in some 
cases, need take no further action to achieve compliance with the NPDES 
besides adhering to the permit conditions. 
Id. 
 169. Brief of the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, supra note 44, at 25-26. 
 170. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12, 
at 18-20. 




navigable waters from any point source.”171  In this definition, “any” is 
used to modify “addition,” “pollutant,” and “point source,” but not to 
modify “navigable waters.”  The government thus argues that the absence 
of the modifier “any” before “navigable waters” indicates Congress’s 
intent to view the nation’s water system as one large water body.172  As 
such, it insists that if Congress wanted to include the movement of water 
from one water body to another within the reach of the NPDES 
permitting program, then “it would have made that extraordinary 
intention manifest.”173  The government urges that this intention could 
have been manifested by either adding the word “any” or another 
appropriate modifier before “navigable waters.” 174  Furthermore, when it 
intended to refer only to individual water bodies in other parts of the 
CWA, Congress used appropriate modifiers to so indicate.175
Another argument raised by the government to support its interpretation 
is that it has been expressly recognized that water transfer activities 
should be regulated through means other than the NPDES permitting 
program.176  For example, in section 101(g) the CWA stipulates that the 
states, not the EPA, have primary responsibility with respect to the 
development and use of their water resources.177  Furthermore, Congress 
has recognized that the water quality issues arising from water transfer 
activities are closely associated with nonpoint sources of pollution, 
 171. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2000). 
 172. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12, 
at 19. 
 173. Id. 
 174. “At the least, [Congress] would have defined the ‘discharge of a pollutant’ to 
include ‘any addition of any pollutant to [a specific portion of the] navigable waters from 
any point source.’” Id. 
 175. 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (2000). 
Whenever, in the judgment of the Administrator or as identified under section 
304, discharges of pollutants from a point source or group of point sources, 
with the application of effluent limitations required under section 301(b)(2) of 
this Act, would interfere with the attainment or maintenance of that water 
quality in a specific portion of the navigable waters which shall assure 
protection of public health, public water supplies, agricultural and industrial 
uses, and the protection and propagation of a balanced population of shellfish, 
fish and wildlife, and allow recreational activities in and on the water, effluent 
limitations (including alternative effluent control strategies) for such point 
source or sources shall be established which can reasonably be expected to 
contribute to the attainment or maintenance of such water quality. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 176. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12, 
at 25-28. 
 177. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000).  The legislative history reveals that “[i]t is the 
purpose of this amendment to insure that State allocation systems are not subverted.”  
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 721 (1994) 
(quoting SENATE AND PUBLIC WORKS COMM, 95D CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977 578 (Comm. Print 1978)). 
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which do not require an NPDES permit and should be regulated as 
such.178
However, the government’s interpretation of the CWA loses momentum 
when viewed in light of its overall objective.  In general, courts should 
favor interpreting statutory terms in ways that further the overall 
objective of the statute.179  As mentioned earlier, the overall objective of 
the CWA is “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters.”180  The government’s unitary waters 
approach would undermine this objective by allowing water from polluted 
water bodies to be transferred to more pristine water sources.  For 
instance, under the government’s unitary waters approach, the NPDES 
permitting program would not regulate the transferring of water from a 
waterway, which serves as a repository for raw sewage from factories 
and towns, to a water body that serves as a drinking water reservoir.181
Moreover, discharges of pollutants that occur in water transfer activities 
will not be adequately regulated by the nonpoint source pollution 
programs.182  In general, nonpoint source programs have proven 
unsuccessful in protecting our waters.183  A 1998 survey conducted by 
 178. A discussion in the House Report illustrates this point: 
Section 304[e] addresses the problem of nonpoint sources of pollutants.  This 
Section and the information on such nonpoint sources is among the most 
important in the 1972 Amendments.  If our water pollution problems are to be 
truly solved, we are going to have to vigorously address the problems of 
nonpoint sources. The Committee, therefore, expects the Administrator to be 
most diligent in gathering and distribution of the guidelines for the 
identification of nonpoint sources and the information on processes, 
procedures, and methods for control of pollution from such nonpoint sources 
as . . . natural and man made changes in the normal flow of surface and ground 
waters. 
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12, at 26-27 
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 92-911, at 109 (1972)). 
 179. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statues in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 405, 503-05 (1989).  See generally Robert R.M. Verchick, Toward Normative 
Rules for Agency Interpretation: Defining Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act, 55 
ALA. L. REV. 845 (2004). 
 180. 33 U.S.C. 1251(a) (2000). 
 181. This example is roughly based on the facts of Dubois v. United States 
Department of Agriculture, 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 182. See The National Water Quality Inventory Report to Congress for 1988, 65 
Fed. Reg. 43,586, 43,587 (July 13, 2000). 
 183. “The success in cleaning up pollution from point sources has not been matched 
by controls over polluted runoff from sources such as farms, urban areas, forestry, 
ranching, and mining operations.”  FINDLEY ET AL., supra note 57, at 391-92.  A recent 
report to Congress has indicated that “rainwater runoff from urban and agricultural land 




the EPA found that nearly forty percent of the nation’s waters are so 
polluted that they cannot support basic activities like swimming and 
fishing.184  The same report acknowledges that the majority of the pollution 
comes from nonpoint sources, which fall outside the reach of the NPDES 
permitting program.185  Therefore, if we follow the government’s 
suggestion to treat water transfer activities the same as nonpoint source 
pollution, we are effectively ignoring the problem.  This flies in the face 
of the objective of the CWA. 
C.  Is the Unitary Waters Approach a Viable Interpretation                              
of the Clean Water Act? 
Before discussing whether the unitary waters approach is a viable 
interpretation of the CWA, it is necessary to review the court’s role in 
reviewing an agency’s interpretation.  In general, courts give great 
deference to the construction of a statute by an administrating agency.186  
This is especially true in the case of the EPA’s interpretions of the CWA 
because of the complex subject matter involved.187  However, if an 
agency’s interpretation nullifies another section of the same statute, then 
it will be ruled unreasonable and rejected.188
In Miccosukee, the Supreme Court raised concerns over a potential 
conflict between the government’s unitary waters approach and other 
NPDES provisions.189  One of these conflicts lies within the “intake 
credits” provision of the NPDES program.190  Under this provision, 
“intake credits” are issued to industrial water users for the pollution that 
are a leading source of impairment.”  The National Water Quality Inventory Report to 
Congress for 1988, 65 Fed. Reg. at 43,587. 
 184. Office of Wastewater Management of the EPA, Water Pollution Control: 25 
Years of Progress and Challenges for the New Millennium 2 (1998), 
http://www.epa.gov/npdespub/pubs/25PROG.PDF (last visited Feb 4, 2005). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) 
(stating that the Court has “long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded 
to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to 
administer”). 
 187. “Congress generally intended that EPA would exercise substantial discretion 
in interpreting the [Clean Water] Act.”  Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumer Power Co., 
862 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 
156, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).  However, there is some debate on whether the government’s 
unitary waters approach should be given deference because the EPA has never formally 
adopted it.  See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 188. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 485 (2001) (stating 
that a reasonable interpretation can never nullify another section of the same statute). 
 189. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 107-08 
(2004) (“The ‘unitary waters’ approach could also conflict with current NPDES 
regulations.”). 
 190. 40 C.F.R. § 122.45 (2003). 
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is already present in the water that they use.191  When these users return 
the water after use, these credits ensure that they will not be forced to 
remove the pollutants that were in the water before it was withdrawn.192  
However, the NPDES program explains that these credits are issued 
“only if the discharger demonstrates that the intake water is drawn from 
the same body of water into which the discharge is made.”193  Therefore, 
it appears that the NPDES permit does regulate water flows within 
individual water bodies.  The government’s approach also conflicts with 
the water quality standards program of the CWA.194  This program requires 
the states to set water quality standards based on the “designated uses of 
the navigable waters involved.”195  Generally, the states assign different 
designated uses not only to separate water bodies, but to different 
portions of the same water bodies.196  If the water body fails to achieve 
its designated use, then the state must allocate a reduction among all 
NPDES permit holders that are discharging pollutants into the water 
body.197  Therefore, this program appears to protect the individual uses 
of the different water bodies.  This dynamic is inconsistent with the 
government’s unitary waters approach which treats all waters of the 
United States as one giant water body.198
V.  OTHER POSSIBLE METHODS FOR DEFINING “MEANINGFULLY 
DISTINCT” WATER BODIES 
In Miccosukee, the Water District and the Tribe had different 
opinions on how the Court should define a “meaningfully distinct” 
water body.199  The Tribe wanted to group water bodies based on 
biological and ecosystem characteristics.200  In contrast, the Water 
 191. Id. 
 192. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 107-08. 
 193. Id. at 107 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 122.45(g)(4)). 
 194. The CWA requires states to establish water quality standards for all intrastate 
waters and to review them every three years.  33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2000). 
 195. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A).  Some examples of the more common designated 
uses are: “drinking water, water-based recreation, fishing/eating, aquatic life, agriculture 
water supply, and industrial water supply.” FINDLEY ET AL., supra note 57, at 456. 
 196. FINDLEY ET AL., supra note 57, at 456. 
 197. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d). 
 198. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 105-06 
(2004). 
 199. Id. at 110. 
 200. Brief for Respondent Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, supra note 24, at 
6-7. 




District wanted the Court to focus on whether the water bodies shared 
a hydrological connection.201
A.  Biological and Ecosystem Characteristics 
The Tribe argued that “meaningfully distinct” water bodies are those 
that do not share similar biological and ecosystem characteristics.202  
This approach makes sense when viewed in light of the overall goal of 
the CWA: “to restore . . . the chemical, physical, and biological integrity 
of the Nation’s waters.”203  In short, biological integrity, and the life 
forms that a water body naturally supports, cannot be restored without 
addressing the chemical composition and the physical make-up of the 
water.  For example, fish that are naturally occurring in a stream will no 
longer thrive there if the water becomes too acidic or too warm (to name 
a few of many changes that a water body can undergo with the addition 
of pollutants).204  By focusing on the natural biological and ecosystem 
characteristics of water as a means of grouping water bodies together, as 
the Tribe encouraged, the overarching goal of the CWA would be 
furthered. 
Furthermore, a biological and ecosystem approach to classifying water 
systems is not a new one.  The Supreme Court has adopted this approach 
when determining whether a non-navigable water body should fall 
within the CWA’s definition of “navigable waters.”205  In United States 
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., the Supreme Court held that non-
navigable wetlands which significantly affect the water quality and 
aquatic ecosystem of an adjacent navigable water body should be 
included within the reach of the CWA.206  With this decision, the Court 
acknowledged the importance of ecological and biological distinctions 
between water bodies.207   
 201. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 6-7.  
 202. Brief for Respondent Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, supra note 24, at 
6-7. 
 203. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).   
 204. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 205. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 
U.S. 159, 167 (2001) (stating that the Court “found that Congress’ concern for the 
protection of water quality and aquatic ecosystems indicated its intent to regulate 
wetlands ‘inseparably bound up with the ‘waters’ of the United States’”); United States 
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985); see supra text 
accompanying notes 102-108. 
 206. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 139. 
 207. Id. 
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B.  Hydrological Connections 
If the Court decided to define “meaningfully distinct” based on 
hydrological connections, then the focus would be on whether bodies of 
water naturally intermingle with each other.208  The rationale behind this 
division is that if the waters already intermingle, then taking water from 
one source and transferring it to another will have no effect.209
This approach appears to be in line with the overall objective of the 
CWA.  If the waters naturally share a significant hydrological connection, 
then pumping water between sources will have no additional effect on 
the physical, chemical, or biological integrity of the waters.210  This is 
also consistent with the EPA’s position involving the “dam” cases 
because mere conveyances or transfers within the same body of water 
would be excluded.211
However, if the pumping activity is significantly mixing the two 
sources beyond the naturally occurring transfer, then this approach 
begins to undermine the overall objective of the CWA.  For example, in 
Miccosukee, natural seepage between the Canal and the Wetland was 
found, and the Water District used the existence of such water flow to 
draw a hydrological connection between the two water bodies.212  While 
this was a hydrological connection, the water was being pumped from 
the Canal into the Wetland at a significantly higher rate than the natural 
gradual seepage from the Wetland to the Canal.213  Furthermore, the 
natural mixing of water was found to flow from the Wetland to the 
Canal, the opposite direction of the water transfer from the pumping 
activity.214  This indicates that there was no naturally occurring transfer 
of the water in the direction of the pumping mechanism.  Consequently, 
the pumping activity was mixing the two sources beyond any naturally 
occurring transfer, which in this case was threatening the biological 
 208. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 6-7. 
 209. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 109-10 
(2004). 
 210. Id. at 109-10. 
 211. See supra text accompanying notes 120-132. 
 212. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 109-11. 
 213. Water is pumped from the Canal to the Wetlands at 2880 cubic feet per 
second.  Brief for Respondent Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, supra note 24, at 
8. 
 214. The Canal is east of the Wetland and the natural flow of the water is eastward.  
Id.  Therefore, absent the water transfer station, the water would naturally flow form the 
Wetland into the Canal.  Id. 




integrity of the Wetland.215  Thus, this transfer undermined the overall 
purpose of the CWA, and the water transfer facility should have been 
required to obtain an NPDES permit. 
C.  A Possible Compromise 
It is possible for the Court to adopt both approaches in a two step 
process.  First, the Court must determine whether the two water bodies 
have similar biological characteristics and/or ecosystems.  If they do 
possess such similar qualities, then the water bodies can be viewed as 
one larger water body and the NPDES permitting program would not 
reach any water transfers between them.  However, if they do not 
possess similar biological characteristics or ecosystems, then the Court 
must determine whether the two water bodies are so hydrologically 
connected that the commingling of the two water sources would still 
occur to the same degree absent human intervention.  If the Court 
determines that a sufficient amount of water naturally flows between 
them, then these water bodies are viewed as one and any water transfers 
between them are exempted from the NPDES permit program.  On the 
other hand, if the Court determines that they are not significantly 
hydrologically connected, then these two water bodies should be 
considered “meaningfully distinct” and any water transferred between 
them can be regulated by the NPDES permit program. 
VI.  POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES 
The potential consequences of subjecting water transfer activities to 
NPDES permit requirements can be significant, especially for the 
western states.  Typically, the western states receive less than thirty 
inches of rain a year.216  This rainfall does not satisfy the water needs of 
the citizens within these states.217  Therefore, it is necessary to transfer 
water though a complex system of man-made reservoirs and natural 
water systems.218  These transfer systems could be held responsible for 
the clean-up costs for a disproportionate amount of pollution.  As 
indicated above, if water transfer activities are considered point sources 
regulated by the CWA, then any pollutant that passes through them 
becomes the responsibility of the water transfer manager.219  Water 
 215. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 101-02. 
 216. Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico in Support of 
Petitioner, supra note 44, at 2. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id.; see supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 219. Brief of Amici Curiae the Nationwide Public Projects Coalition et al. in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 44, at 6-12. 
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managers would be responsible for cleaning any pollutant that passes 
through their system, regardless of origin.  To put this in perspective, a 
water manager located in Southern California could be responsible for a 
nonpoint source pollutant that enters the Colorado River in Arizona but 
is later conveyed by a water transfer station in San Diego.  Additionally, 
these water managers would be civilly and criminally liable for the 
pollution.220
The facts in Miccosukee highlight the potential unfairness of holding 
water transfer managers responsible for the pollution that passes through 
their stations.221  In Miccosukee, the Water District was brought into 
court for pollution that was generated from agricultural run-off.222  
However, a quick look at the parties of the case shows that no person or 
organization producing the pollutant will be held liable for this 
pollution.223  Why?  Because agricultural run-off is specifically defined 
as a nonpoint source and as such, is outside the reach of the NPDES 
permit program.224  Therefore, the Water District was sued over a 
pollutant that, absent a subsequent transfer point, would not be subject to 
NPDES regulation.  Furthermore, the Water District had no choice but to 
pump the polluted water.225  If the pumps were turned off, a populated 
area would have been flooded.226
On the other hand, even though regulating water transfers has the 
potential to unfairly prejudice water managers, this decision does have 
its justifications.  Primarily, as mentioned earlier, to exempt all water 
transfers would undermine the overriding policy of the CWA.227  In 
addition, regulating water transfers presents an alternative for the 
unsuccessful nonpoint source pollution plan that is currently in place. 
The CWA has not been successful in eliminating nonpoint source 
pollution from U.S. waters.228  In a 1998 report to Congress, the EPA 
reported that thirty-five percent of rivers and streams and forty-five 
percent of lakes are still impaired and further acknowledged that 
 220. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2000). 
 221. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004). 
 222. Id. at 100-02. 
 223. The only defendant is the South Florida Water District.  Id. at 95. 
 224. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000); see supra text accompanying note 90. 
 225. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. 
 226. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
 227. See supra Section IV(B)(3). 
 228. See Nancy Stoner, Clean Water at Risk: A 30th Anniversary Assessment of the 
Bush Administration’s Rollback of Clean Water Protections 9-24 (2002), 
http://www.amrivers.org/doc_respository/cwa30.pdf (last visited Feb 4, 2005). 




nonpoint source pollution is the main reason why these waters are still 
polluted.229  Moreover, the report went on to state that the leading cause 
of noncompliance of rivers and streams is nonpoint source run-off from 
agriculture.230
Currently, there are federally subsidized facilities that are used to 
improve water quality.231  These publicly owned treatment works 
(POTWs) collect wastewater from surrounding areas and remove 
harmful pollutants from the waste so that it may be safely discharged 
into the receiving water body.232  Water transfer stations could follow 
this model and act as treatment centers for nonpoint source pollution that 
enters U.S. waters.  This approach might be a fair balance between the 
inequity of holding water transfer managers liable for another’s pollution 
and the need to develop a program addressing nonpoint source pollution.  
However, this approach would be extremely costly.233  In the end, a 
proposal of this magnitude would ultimately have to be approved by 
Congress. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
In sum, how the Court ultimately defines “meaningfully distinct” 
water bodies will determine whether water transfer activities fall within 
the reach of the NPDES program.  Under the government’s unitary 
waters approach, all water transfers would not require NPDES permits.  
 229. Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and 
Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of 
Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 
43,586, 43,587 (July 13, 2000). 
 230. Id.; see also David Zaring, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and 
Regulatory Control: The Clean Water Act’s Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 515, 517-18 (1996) (stating that nonpoint sources account for sixty-five to 
seventy-five percent of the pollution in the nation’s most polluted waters and that 
agriculture run-off is “the single largest nonpoint source of surface water pollution”). 
 231. See FINDLEY ET AL., supra note 57, at 454-55 for a general discussion of 
POTWs. 
 232. Id. 
Public owned treatment works (POTWs) collect wastewater from homes, 
commercial buildings, and industrial facilities and transport it via a series of 
pipes, known as a collection system, to the treatment plant.  The POTW 
removes harmful organisms and other contaminates from the sewage so it can 
be discharged safely in the receiving water body. 
Id. In order to encourage the construction of POTWs, the government created a $60 
billion federal grant program.  Id. at 455.  As a condition of receiving grant money, the 
states were required “to establish area-wide management agencies with both planning 
and regulatory functions for waste treatment.”  Id. 
 233. In a 1998 report, the EPA suggested that it would cost an estimated $139.5 
billion to correct the current water quality problems.  Office of Wastewater Management, 
Water Pollution Control: 25 Years of Progress and Challenges for the New Millennium 2 
(1998), http://www.epa.gov/npdespub/pubs/25PROG.PDF (last visited Feb 4, 2005). 
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In contrast, under the Tribe’s biological and ecosystem approach and 
the Water District’s hydrological approach, at least some water transfer 
activities would be regulated by the NPDES program.  Although the 
government presents several arguments to support its approach, none of 
them are clearly convincing.  Furthermore, its approach appears to 
conflict with other aspects of the CWA, possibly causing the Court to 
reject it on those grounds alone.  However, the government is correct 
that exposing water transfer activities to the NPDES program could 
unfairly shift the clean-up of water pollution to the people in charge of 
these transfer stations.  This reason alone is insufficient to totally exempt 
all water transfer activities from the NPDES program regardless of their 
environmental impacts.  Instead, the government should treat these water 
transfer points as an opportunity to solve the nonpoint source pollution 
problems facing the nation. 
Both the Water District’s and the Tribe’s approach appear consistent 
with the overall objective of the CWA.  Instead of choosing one 
approach over the other, it would make the most sense to adopt them 
both in a two-step test.234  This test would ensure that water transfers 
causing environmental harm to the receiving water body would fall 
within the reach of the NPDES permit program, but would not impose 
NPDES permitting requirements on water transfers within the same 
water body. 
 













 234. See supra Part V.C. 
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